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Abstract. This article relates the philosophical discussion on naturalistic 
religious practice to Tim Crane’s The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an 
Atheist’s Point of View, in which he claims that atheists can derive no genuine 
solace from religion. I argue that Crane’s claim is a little too strong. There is a 
sense in which atheists can derive solace from religion and that fact is worth 
acknowledging (whether or not this counts as ‘genuine’ solace).
i. intRoduction
There are naturalists who feel an affinity with some religion, perhaps because 
they have been brought up in it, or perhaps because they are close to people 
who belong to it, or for some other reason. This phenomenon raises some in-
teresting philosophical questions. How should we think of the role religious 
doctrines play in religion, and to what extent can those who reject religious 
beliefs enter into aspects of the religious life? Thinking about these leads one 
to consider the prior question of what it is that demarcates religion from oth-
er endeavors. Talk of ‘naturalistic religious practice’ implies both that there is 
an intelligible distinction between naturalism and religion in theory, and that 
there is some middle ground between the two in practice.
The aim of this article is to relate the philosophical discussion on natural-
istic religious practice to Tim Crane’s conception of religion and to his claim 
that atheists can derive no genuine solace from religion. I’ll argue that there is 
a sense in which atheists can derive solace from religion, and that that fact is 
worth acknowledging (whether or not this counts as ‘genuine’ solace).
The main aim of The Meaning of Belief is to correct what Crane sees as short-
comings in the New Atheists’ conception of religion (where by ‘New Atheists’, he 
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means such writers as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christo-
pher Hitchens, and A. C. Grayling).1 As will become clear, I find Crane’s concep-
tion of religion interesting and accurate to a large extent (I say a bit more about 
what I mean by this in section 3). But I’d like to emphasize that the value of the 
book as a corrective measure to the New Atheist movement is not my topic here; 
i.e. I’m not discussing the extent to which Crane’s critique of the New Atheists 
succeeds. What follows is intended to be compatible with the New Atheists’ writ-
ings containing a wealth of important insights. I’m commenting merely on the re-
lation between Crane’s conception of religion and naturalistic religious practice.
Let me start with some terminological remarks. By ‘naturalism’ I mean 
the view that there are no supernatural aspects to reality. Naturalism implies 
atheism, which is the claim that the theistic God does not exist. By ‘theism’, I 
mean the view that there is a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and om-
nibenevolent, who created the world, and who is still actively involved in the 
world. I won’t attempt to define ‘supernatural’, but I mean to include at least 
all claims about entities like gods or angels, and/or about the actions of such 
entities, like creation, miracles, or salvation, and/or about states of affairs in-
volving holiness or heaven or hell.
Section 1 outlines Crane’s conception of religion and his critical remarks on 
the possibility of ‘atheistic religion’. Section 2 develops a version of religious fic-
tionalism that can function as a basis for naturalistic religious practice, defends 
it from objections and recommends it over an alternative version. Section 3 re-
turns to Crane’s position. The upshot will be that there is a sense in which natu-
ralists (including atheists) can derive solace from religion, and that this sense is 
all the more significant if one takes on board Crane’s claim that religious belief 
is inherently paradoxical, which I’ll provide some support for.
ii. the Religious iMpulse and identification
Crane acknowledges that one may well wonder at the outset what is meant 
by ‘religion’. He points out that few things can be rigorously defined, and that 
there is likely to be no single essence of religion, but proposes that we think 
of the phenomenon as follows. Religion is “a systematic and practical attempt 
1 Tim Crane, The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View (Harvard Univ. 
Press, 2017).
Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 159
by human beings to find meaning in the world and their place in it, in terms 
of their relationship to something transcendent”.2 One of these transcendent 
entities is the God of Western theism.
This is the phenomenon Crane is offering a conception of. The concep-
tion has two key ingredients: the religious impulse, and identification. By ‘re-
ligious impulse’, Crane means a belief (or the tendency towards forming a 
belief) with a certain complex content. Quoting William James, he says this 
is the belief ‘that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in 
harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto’.3 It’s the belief that “this can’t be all 
there is; there must be something more to the world”, something that gives life 
as a whole meaning.4 He also calls this belief in the transcendent. This belief 
gives the believer’s life meaning because it is a belief in an unseen order, align-
ment with which makes life as a whole meaningful. So it’s a belief about what 
the world is like, but one with important practical implications, regarding the 
behaviors that are likely to produce alignment with that unseen order.
Crane thinks this notion of the religious impulse differs in several key 
ways from the New Atheists’ understanding of religious belief. First, the con-
tent of the religious impulse is not intended as a hypothesis in the scientific 
sense. It’s not intended to provide an explanation by fitting an explanandum 
into a general pattern, and/or by relating it to something simpler and more 
intelligible.5 Secondly, according to Crane, the content of the religious im-
pulse is inherently mysterious. There are inbuilt limits to how intelligible that 
unseen order can become to us. (I return to these claims in section 3.)
The second ingredient in Crane’s conception of religion is the element of 
identification, which he takes to be about religious practice. He takes the key 
features of religious practice to be repetition, i.e. the historical dimension of 
religious practice, and a social dimension, i.e. the fact that one typically en-
gages in these actions with other people. ‘Identification’ is intended to stand 
for both of these features.
2 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 6.
3 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (Longmans, 
Green and Co, 1902), 53.
4 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 38.
5 For some worries about the view of science implicit in this, see Arif Ahmed, “The Meaning 
of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View, by Tim Crane”, Mind 127, no. 508 (2018): 1265.
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Note that Crane prefers talk of the transcendent to talk of the supernatu-
ral. At least he rejects the New Atheists’ use of the term ‘supernatural’ as at 
once too sophisticated (“religious believers need not operate with the clear-
cut idea of the supernatural attributed to them by today’s philosophers and 
scientists”) and too simplistic (“the idea of God is not simply the idea of a 
supernatural agent who made the world”).6 But as I’m using ‘supernatural’, it 
is not at all clear-cut (though useful nonetheless). Moreover, while theism is, 
amongst other things, a thesis about a supernatural agent, this is compatible 
with there being more to its content, as well as with the possibility that its 
content is quite complex (see section 3).
Consider now Crane’s stance on the possibility of naturalistic religious 
practice. Even though it is not his main concern, Crane touches on this topic 
at various points in the book. For example, when commenting on Ronald 
Dworkin and Alain de Botton, he makes two points. The first is that what-
ever each of these authors is proposing, it shouldn’t be called Religion (as in 
Dworkin’s Religion without God, or De Botton’s Religion for Atheists), since 
neither proposal involves the religious impulse, one of the key ingredients of 
religion.7 I agree: what these authors are proposing involves a rejection of the 
supernatural (and of the transcendent). That feature will make what they are 
proposing importantly different from the original phenomenon. And it does 
matter that we not stretch terms (‘religion’) beyond the limits of usefulness. 
So what these writers are proposing can’t literally be an atheistic religion; nor 
could anyone else propose anything that is best described as such.
Crane’s second point, though, is the following:
I share these thinkers’ opposition to the New Atheists. But I don’t think an 
atheist can find genuine solace in religion. There are things to admire in 
the religious traditions in the world, but it is one thing to admire aspects 
of a religion and another to try to adopt its practices without believing its 
doctrines.8
While there may be much to disagree with in De Botton’s and Dworkin’s pro-
posals (who are, after all, Crane’s targets in this passage), it is worth situating 
these remarks with respect to the recent philosophical literature on the topic. 
6 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 12–13.
7 Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God (Harvard Univ. Press, 2013); Alain Botton, 
Religion for Atheists (Penguin, 2012).
8 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 23.
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When we zoom into the practical grey area between religion and naturalism, 
we do find room for naturalistic religious practice.
I should note right away that Crane may not disagree with anything that 
follows, since he allows that there can be people who participate in religious 
practices without any sense of the transcendent, i.e. without the religious im-
pulse.9 He also suggests that many Jews and Christians are deeply embed-
ded in their respective religious traditions, while nevertheless lacking what 
Thomas Nagel calls ‘the religious temperament’, which is the need for an as-
piration “to live not merely the life of the creature one is, but in some sense to 
participate through it in the life of the universe as a whole”.10 For Crane, these 
Jews and Christians are religious in a sense, even though they lack a religious 
temperament, and even though many of them also lack the religious impulse.
What, then, is the sense in which they are religious? And, is it really the 
case that none of them can find solace in religion, when “[i]t is of supreme 
importance in their lives that they are [for example] Jews, that what they are 
doing is what their parents and grandparents did, and that their lives would 
not make any real sense without it”?11
iii. Religious fictionalisM
To get clearer on what is available to naturalists here, let’s consider the posi-
tion known as fictionalism, which has been deployed in a variety of philo-
sophical domains. One particular variety of fictionalism will be most relevant 
to our purposes.12
9 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 106.
10 Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and The Religious Temperament (OUP, 2010), 5.
11 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 52.
12 For some recent applications of fictionalism to the religious domain, see e.g. Peter Lipton, 
“Science and Religion: The Immersion Solution”, in Realism and Religion: Philosophical and 
Theological Perspectives, ed. Michael Scott and Andrew Moore (Taylor and Francis, 2007); 
Benjamin Cordry, “A Critique of Religious Fictionalism”, Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (2010); 
Andrew Eshleman, “Religious Fictionalism Defended: Reply to Cordry”, Religious Studies 
46, no.  1 (2010); Victoria Harrison, “Philosophy of Religion, Fictionalism, and Religious 
Diversity”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68, no. 1-3 (2010); Christopher Jay, 
“The Kantian Moral Hazard Argument for Religious Fictionalism”, International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 75, no. 3 (2014); Natalja Deng, “Religion for Naturalists”, International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78, no. 2 (2015); Robin Le Poidevin, “Playing the God Game: 
The Perils of Religious Fictionalism”, in Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics 
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Take an approach to the language in a given domain that combines the 
following three claims. (1) The sentences in that domain are truth-apt (they 
can be true or false) and ordinarily express beliefs; (2) at least some of them 
are about what they seem to be about — that is, they are not entirely figura-
tive or metaphorical; but (3) our attitudes towards these sentences need not be 
truth-normed. Although the sentences in question purport to describe reality, 
our attitude towards them need not depend on their truth or falsity. Our atti-
tude can be one of non-doxastic acceptance. This is supposed to be a distinctive 
kind of state of commitment that doesn’t involve belief. The value involved in 
believing sentences in this domain is independent of whether our attitudes are 
non-doxastic. Elsewhere, I have called this view ‘Weak Evaluative Fictionalism’ 
or WEF.13 (Note that religious WEF can also be explored in connection with ag-
nosticism. But the focus here will be on its uses for understanding naturalistic 
(including atheistic) religious practice.) I will call the conjunction of (1) and (2) 
a realist approach to the language in a given domain.14
In the background of religious WEF and of realism about religious lan-
guage, is the assumption that there are such things as sentences with a religious 
subject matter, and that it makes sense to enquire into their meaning. Exam-
ples of religious sentences might include ‘For God so loved the world that he 
gave his one and only Son’, ‘He will come again in glory to judge the living and 
the dead’, or ‘God is our refuge and strength’. This basic assumption contrasts 
with approaches such as those of William Alston and (according to some) Lud-
wig Wittgenstein.15 For example, Wittgenstein in some places implies that the 
meaning of religious utterances (‘There will be a Last Judgement’) is so radi-
cally context-dependent that their meaning cannot be approached by thinking 
about the meaning of religious sentences. He contends that when a religious 
person says ‘There will be a Last Judgement’ and a non-religious person says 
‘There will not be a Last Judgement’, they do not contradict one another.
of the Divine, ed. Andrei A. Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa (OUP, 2016); Finlay Malcolm, 
“Can Fictionalists Have Faith?”, Religious Studies 54, no. 2 (2018); Michael Scott and Finlay 
Malcolm, “Religious Fictionalism”, Philosophy Compass (forthcoming).
13 Deng, “Religion for Naturalists”.
14 Some authors include in the definition of a ‘realist’ semantics for a language the claim that 
some of the sentences in question are true. As I’m using the term, that is not part of it.
15 See Michael Scott, “Religious Language”, Philosophy Compass 5, no. 6 (2010).
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Any plausible approach to the semantics of religious language has to 
take into account the considerable role that context plays in determining the 
meaning of religious utterances. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that religious 
sentences, like other sentences, have some stable semantic content. After all, 
we seem able to communicate about religious matters, and to voice diverging 
opinions about them.
Realism about religious language also opposes expressivist and reduc-
tionist approaches to the semantic project by maintaining that religious sen-
tences are ordinarily used to express beliefs (rather than merely plans, atti-
tudes, or emotions), and that at least some religious sentences are about what 
they seem to be about. At least some religious sentences are not just codified 
ways of talking about aspects of the natural or social world. WEF’s distinc-
tive addition to this is the claim that the value associated with the religious 
domain is independent of whether we believe the sentences in question, or 
merely non-doxastically accept them.
That can sound quite incredible. Consider such values as solace or hope. 
How can the naturalist derive any such thing from non-doxastically accept-
ing religious sentences? Some of these sentences state that there is reason to 
think that there is an after-life, during which one will see one’s loved ones 
again. Similarly, some others state that there is a divine being who guides all 
that happens in the universe, and who deeply cares for each of us. If truth and 
falsity make no difference to the acceptability of these sentences, then when 
do they matter? Surely the values in question are inaccessible to naturalists.
One reaction one might have to these questions is to weaken religious 
WEF somewhat. Perhaps not all of the value accessible to religious believers 
is independent of belief, but some of it is. The problem with this weaker form 
of religious WEF is one that also afflicts the stronger one: it’s unclear how one 
can non-doxastically accept anything. Non-doxastic acceptance is intended 
to be acceptance in all ‘ordinary’, ‘non-critical’ contexts. Roughly, the idea is 
that as long as one is not doing philosophy, or otherwise critically probing 
one’s beliefs, one assents to the sentences in question, but in ‘critical contexts’, 
one dissents. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that there is a principled distinction 
between ‘critical’ and ‘non-critical’ contexts.16 All we can say is that in any 
16 See Zoltán G. Szabó, “Critical Study of Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.) Fictionalism in 
Mataphysics”, Noûs 45, no. 2 (2011).
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given context, a variety of considerations are potentially relevant, and we usu-
ally choose to bracket some but not others. Since non-doxastic acceptance is 
defined as assent in all but ‘critical’ context, this is a serious problem for WEF, 
even in a weakened form. This means that WEF does not achieve its aim: it 
doesn’t really offer a principled way for naturalists to use religious language, 
in a way that allows them to live just as if the religion were true. Assuming 
that we want to avoid periodic wavering, hypocrisy, and mental fragmenta-
tion, we have not yet found a viable basis for naturalistic religious practice.
But there is such a basis. If we want, we can still call this a version of re-
ligious fictionalism (though not of WEF).17 A note of caution before we pro-
ceed: what follows is a description of a fictionalist basis on which naturalists 
can engage in religious practice. The kind of naturalist I’m addressing feels an 
affinity with some religions, or with a particular religion. This suggests that 
in some sense they think religious practice has some value. For my purposes, 
we can just take this to mean that they think religious practice achieves some-
thing that they value, such as inspiration, comfort, personal or spiritual or 
moral growth, a sense of purpose, or a sense of community. So I’ll assume, for 
the purposes of this discussion, that such things are available to some people 
by religious means. I won’t, however, assume anything about whether religion 
also has dis-value, or about whether that dis-value outweighs any value it may 
have, either in the case of believers or even in the case of the naturalist practi-
tioner I’ll describe. A fortiori, it’s no part of my proposal that naturalists who 
don’t feel such an affinity should become religious practitioners.
Unlike (perhaps more properly so-called) fictionalist positions in many 
other domains, the version that best fits the religious domain does not make 
use of the notion of non-doxastic acceptance. It does not aim to allow the 
naturalist to live a life that is indistinguishable from a believer’s in all but 
‘critical contexts’. Instead, it simply emphasizes the possibility of treating a re-
ligious tradition and its texts like a story, and of engaging in a game of make-
believe.18 For example, when taking part in a religious service, one immerses 
17 It was pointed out by referees that it makes sense to retain the ‘fictionalist’ label for the 
view I’m proposing. I wouldn’t insist on the label though.
18 Richard Joyce, when advocating fictionalism about morality, talks of a spectrum of stances 
(Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (CUP, 2001), Ch. 7). At the near end of the spectrum, 
there is the stance we all take with respect to fiction, for example when we tell a story or 
otherwise engage with one. At the far end, there is non-doxastic acceptance. The position 
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oneself in a story, and becomes an actor within the fictional world of that 
religion’s world view. As Le Poidevin has pointed out, the mere experience of 
the religious service can have the power to engage one’s emotions,
to the extent that a religious service is capable of being an intense experience. 
The immediate object of our emotions is the fictional God, but there is a wider 
object, and that is the collection of real individuals in our lives. In the game of 
make-believe (for example, the Christian one), we are presented with a series 
of dramatic images: an all- powerful creator, who is able to judge our moral 
worth, to forgive us or to condemn, who appears on Earth in human form and 
who willingly allows himself to be put to death. What remains, when the game 
of make-believe is over, is an awareness of our responsibilities for ourselves 
and others, of the need to pursue spiritual goals, and so on.19
In a similar way, the naturalist can take part in a variety of religious rituals 
and forms of worship.
One of the objections often raised for fictionalism in this and other do-
mains is this: isn’t the fictionalist practitioner constantly expressing beliefs they 
don’t have, and thereby lying to those around them? This can seem particu-
larly worrying in the religious case, given the intimate role that religion plays 
in many believers’ lives. But it’s important to keep in mind that on the version 
of fictionalism proposed, the naturalist is not acting just as if the religion were 
true. They are not hiding their rejection of the supernatural. Rather, they are 
consciously and transparently engaging with a religious tradition by treating it 
and its texts as a story. Religious practices are for them tools for creating certain 
atmospheres - namely ones that will instill a sense of something sacred.
Le Poidevin defends a different form of religious fictionalism from the 
one proposed here. His version, like WEF, is more susceptible to the ob-
jection discussed in the previous paragraph. On Le Poidevin’s version, the 
truth-conditions of religious sentences are as follows: “any given [religious 
sentence] p is true if and only if it is true in the theological fiction that p”.20 Le 
Poidevin thinks that this version, involving a ‘fictionalist semantics’, is prefer-
able to the one advocated here, which accepts a realist semantics and adds 
talk of a distinctive fictionalist attitude of make-believe:
I’m describing is located on the near end of Joyce’s spectrum, near more familiar activities of 
make-believe (see Deng, “Religion for Naturalists”).
19 Robin Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 
(Routledge, 1996), 119.
20 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 178.
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[I]t is not clear that the attitude is rationally sustainable independently of the 
corresponding semantics. On the other hand, treating theological statements 
as if they were true clearly fits comfortably with the supposition that they are 
in fact fictional. That, arguably, is the purer position.21
Thus, according to Le Poidevin, it makes more sense to combine the fictional-
ist attitude of make-believe with a ‘fictionalist semantics’.
I have two related worries about this. The first is that, as Le Poidevin is 
no doubt aware, the fictionalist semantics proposed (according to which e.g. 
‘God gave his only Son’ is true if and only if ‘according to Christianity/the 
theological fiction, God gave his only Son’) fares rather badly as a semantics 
for the religious sentences as used by believers. This is not what religious be-
lievers mean when they use religious sentences. Religious believers are mak-
ing statements about the world, not about the theological fiction advocated 
by their religious institution. Le Poidevin’s position seems to be that those 
who take a realist view of the semantics (including religious believers, but 
also atheists and agnostics) are right about the semantics of religious sen-
tences as used by them, while fictionalists are right about the semantics of 
religious sentences as used by themselves.22
But that’s a bit strange. Suppose a religious fictionalist (of the kind Le 
Poidevin is interested in) encounters some non-fictionalists, either in the 
context of a religious service, or while talking about religion. Of course, the 
fictionalist can use the religious sentences to mean something different from 
everyone else, but presumably they can’t deny that they understand what the 
others are using them to mean. After all, there is nothing unclear about using 
the sentence ‘God loves us’ to say that God loves us (as opposed to that ac-
cording to some theological fiction, God loves us). Given that the fictionalist 
understands this, it seems odd to decide to ignore this straightforward mean-
ing and instead use the same sentence to mean something entirely different. 
Why not use a different sentence (such as, ‘according to some theological fic-
tion, God loves us’) to mean that according to some theological fiction, God 
loves us? This worry relates back to the objection discussed above. It’s hard 
to imagine why the fictionalist would adopt such a non-standard semantics, 
other than for the reason that they want to blend in and give the impression 
21 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 181.
22 Le Poidevin, “Playing the God Game”, 182.
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of more agreement than there really is. Better to accept the realist semantics, 
and just to adopt a fictionalist attitude (of make-believe) — which, after all, is 
what really matters to Le Poidevin’s fictionalist too.
The second worry is more serious, because it concerns the very ability of Le 
Poidevin’s fictionalist to adopt the fictionalist attitude in question. On the ‘fic-
tionalist semantics’ proposed, there seems to be no room for a fictionalist atti-
tude. ‘God gave his only Son’ is simply true, on that semantics, because it means 
that according to the Christian theological fiction, God gave his only Son. So 
there is nothing for the fictionalist to adopt a fictionalist attitude towards: it 
wouldn’t make sense to make-believe that according to Christianity, God gave 
his only Son. That’s just something we all believe and know to be the case.23
Let’s return to the version of fictionalism proposed here. There is even 
the possibility of a fictionalist version of prayer. Elsewhere I have called this 
‘make-believe prayer’.24 Le Poidevin too emphasizes this possibility. He con-
cedes that there are kinds of prayer that are not available to the fictionalist, 
for example petitionary prayer (asking God for things) or seeking compan-
ionship with God. But he suggests that the fictionalist may still be able to use 
prayer to align their will with what they imagine would be God’s will. Sup-
pose the idea of God represents for them an ideal of perfect love.
[The fictionalist] might find it helpful to voice, in her head, her own 
thoughts, as if they were addressed to another person, and imagine what 
someone motivated only by love would say in response. And, without there 
being any actually hallucinatory experience, answers may come to her as if 
they did not have their origin in her own thoughts. Phenomenologically, this 
could have a great deal in common with the experience of prayer that many 
realists have.25
It might seem strange to want to dedicate feelings of gratitude or humility to 
a being one believes is not there. But if one resonates with the idea of an all 
powerful, all-loving creator who is able to hear and listen to one’s concern, 
then it can make experiential sense to momentarily dedicate feelings of grati-
tude, or humility, to that fictional God. In Petru Dumitriu’s words: “I cast my 
23 Scott and Malcolm, “Religious Fictionalism” point to further problems with Le Poidevin’s 
version of religious fictionalism. Actually, as they also note, many of these problems are not 
specific to the application of this kind of fictionalism to the religious domain.
24 Deng, “Religion for Naturalists”.
25 Le Poidevin, “Playing the God Game”, 187.
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gratitude into the void, I want to call out in the void. If there is no one there, 
I want to address myself to that strange absence”.26
iV. MysteRy and optiMisM
One can acknowledge the possibility of meaningful naturalist religious prac-
tice without losing sight of the distinction between religion and naturalism.
Recall the two key ingredients of religion according to Crane, the reli-
gious impulse, and identification (repetition and the social dimension). The 
religious impulse is a belief in the transcendent, an unseen order, alignment 
with which gives our lives meaning, while “[t]he element of identification 
consists in the fact that religion involves institutions to which believers be-
long and practices in which they participate”.27
I said at the outset that Crane’s conception seems accurate to a large ex-
tent. What do I mean by ‘a large extent’? Here is one general point about the 
scope of what follows. Consider Arif Ahmed’s review of Crane. Ahmed is 
commenting on the extent which Crane’s critique of the New Atheists suc-
ceeds, and he argues that it does not. Interestingly, he prefaces his criticism 
with the following:
I can imagine many humane and thoughtful Jews, Christians and Muslims 
finding in this book an almost unimprovable articulation of their own 
approaches to faith. I myself have learnt, and I expect many atheists will 
learn, much more than I thought could intelligibly be said about what 
religious belief could and perhaps should be. What it is, is another question.28
To my mind, the first sentence implies that Crane has an accurate conception 
of the religion practiced by some people, namely those humane and thought-
ful theists. I take myself to be focusing on just them; this is the scope of what 
follows. Let’s call their version of theism humane theism. It might be nice to 
be able to offer some empirically grounded estimates of the size of this group, 
but I won’t attempt that here. If it turns out to be a much smaller group than I 
imagine, so that this is a large concession towards the New Atheists, so be it. 
What follows is just about humane theism.
26 Petru Dumitriu, To the Unknown God (Au Dieu Inconnu) (Seabury Press, 1982), 106.
27 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 23.
28 Ahmed, “The Meaning of Belief ”, 1261.
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Let’s now return to Crane’s discussion of ‘atheistic religion’. I said that he’s 
right to point out that there can be no such thing. Dworkin’s proposal lacks 
both elements of religion. De Botton’s proposal aims to make room for the el-
ement of identification, but it leaves no place for the religious impulse — un-
surprisingly, since that impulse is a belief the naturalist rejects. There can’t 
literally be a naturalistic religion (nor an atheistic religion); a naturalist can’t 
take over religion and its practices without altering its nature.
But we can see now that Crane’s overall assessment isn’t right: there is a 
sense in which a naturalist can find solace in religion (that is, in naturalistic 
religious practice). Not in the sense of the conviction, or even hope, of an 
afterlife or of an unseen order that provides for us and sees to it that justice 
is done in the end.29 Nor in the sense of knowing, or even hoping, that a di-
vine being is listening to and caring for one’s concerns in the present. What 
is available has to do not with (degrees of) belief, but merely with thoughts: 
the very thought of such an unseen transcendent order can elicit a positive 
emotional reaction. This is in principle no more puzzling than thoughts of 
disaster (such as one’s house burning down) eliciting negative emotional re-
actions, even if one knows that these thoughts have nothing to do with real-
ity. And though the reactions are momentary, one can choose to elicit them 
repeatedly. Compare this also to aesthetic experience. Music too elicits reac-
tions only in a given moment, but people choose to consume it repeatedly.
Naturalistic religious practice, then, can involve both identification (in 
both the historical and social senses), and some connection to the (content 
of the) religious impulse. Though a naturalist rejects the belief in an unseen 
order, they can choose to repeatedly entertain thoughts of it, and to let specific 
religious stories about the nature of that unseen order engage them emotion-
ally. Moreover, the naturalist practitioner can spend as much time within the 
religious game of make-believe as they choose. They can even include ideas 
and practices from different religious traditions. Theirs is a sui generis form of 
engagement with religion (though one that I think already exists).
29 I think it is possible, without irrationality, to wish for p while disbelieving p; but I do not 
think the same holds for hoping that p while disbelieving p (cf Malcolm, “Can Fictionalists 
Have Faith?”, 228; for further discussion see Einar Duenger Bohn, “The Logic of Hope: A 
Defense of the Hopeful”, Religious Studies 54, no. 1 (2018)). Moreover, I do not think the 
naturalist practitioner necessarily needs to hope or wish that the religious story be true. One 
need not want a story to be true in order to find aspects of it beautiful or otherwise engaging.
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One could now insist that all this doesn’t amount to solace in a substantial 
sense. Without getting distracted by quibbles over what counts as ‘genuine’ 
solace, the important point is that one shouldn’t be too quick to dismiss the 
value of what is available to some naturalists in this way. This becomes even 
clearer if one reflects on what exactly is available to the believer at various 
points during their lives. Crane points out that the religious impulse is rather 
more complex than is often assumed. Talk of the afterlife is just as often an 
expression of a fragile hope as it is an expression of a comforting conviction. 
Crane also describes what he calls the essential paradoxicality of the content 
of the religious impulse, quoting Alfred N. Whitehead:
Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and 
within the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and 
yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility and yet 
the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes 
and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good 
and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the 
hopeless quest.30
This point seems to me relevant to the question of how significant we should 
take naturalist religious practice to be, because it refines our picture of what 
is available to the believer. It’s not just that the believer struggles with main-
taining belief in the face of suffering, though that is a very real struggle.31 It’s 
that, at least in many religious traditions, the very nature of the transcend-
ent — and with it, the very nature of what it is one does when engaging with 
ideas about the transcendent — has to remain mysterious. It’s not just beyond 
human understanding how, if God exists, the world can contain the suffering 
it contains. Ultimately, it’s beyond human understanding even what it would 
be for God to exist. And when that is part of a story, the value of engaging with 
that story becomes to an additional degree independent of belief or hope. 
Part of what matters in religious practice is simply opening oneself up to the 
feeling of existential uncertainty, by repeatedly engaging with the very idea of 
the transcendent.32
30 Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Free Press, 1967), 192.
31 This struggle is probably one that is not accessible to the naturalist (though see Le 
Poidevin, “Playing the God Game”, 187, for the suggestion of a fictionalist counterpart).
32 It might be objected here that not all religious traditions involve mysticism, and that their 
interpretation should not overemphasize this element of mystery and paradoxicality. Crane an-
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One reason some naturalists might want to do this is that they too may in-
clude mystery somewhere in their world view, even if they don’t connect that 
mystery to anything transcendent. That is, the world according to a naturalist 
may be mysterious in some secular sense (as Crane himself seems to suggest in 
places).33 If in addition, they find some religious story a beautiful reaction to that 
mystery, then they too can appreciate that story. But even if a naturalist finds no 
place for anything worth calling ‘mystery’ in their world view, if they feel an af-
finity with some religious tradition, they can still engage in that tradition’s prac-
tices, and experience some of the same sense of the sacred as a believer might.
One other point from The Meaning of Belief is relevant here. Crane makes 
a distinction between what he calls ‘pessimistic atheists’ and ‘optimistic athe-
ists’. Pessimistic atheists (of which he says he is one) find the religious impulse 
intelligible and acknowledge that the transcendent would give life meaning of 
a kind it can never actually have. They also acknowledge that religious believ-
ers are able to appreciate religious art and music in a way no secular person 
can. Optimistic atheists, as Crane thinks of them, are inclined to disagree on 
both points. They think their experience of works of religious art shows that 
they too can fully appreciate them. Moreover, the Cranean optimistic atheist 
finds the religious impulse unintelligible. They think the idea of the ‘enchant-
ment’ of the world, of the world really harbouring an unseen order that gives 
life as a whole meaning, is a kind of confusion. So they won’t concede that 
a naturalist world view is in any sense bleak, because what the naturalist has 
rejected didn’t make sense in the first place.
Religious fictionalism of the kind described here, and the naturalistic reli-
gious practice it grounds, have a distinctly optimistic flavor. But neither relies 
on the optimist’s claim that the religious impulse is unintelligible, in the sense 
that there was never anything there to hope for. The religious impulse makes 
enough sense to be an object of hope, and the naturalist does not share that 
ticipates this objection: “This is not to say that orthodox versions of Judaism, Islam, and Chris-
tianity should be regarded as mystical faiths, but only that they place certain epistemic limits on 
believers: that is, limits about what they can know” (Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 57). Admit-
tedly, there is a difference between there being limits to what can be known (or said) and there 
being hardly anything that can be known (or said), and talk of an ‘ultimate’ mystery can mask a 
slide between these two claims. But it seems to me that in practice, the element of mystery Crane 
describes does play a central role even in orthodox versions of Western theistic religions.
33 E.g. Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 159.
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hope (see footnote 28). Since they believe there is no transcendent aspect to 
reality, they cannot, without periodic wavering or mental fragmentation, live 
just as if the religion were true, or even just as if it might be true. Naturalistic 
religious practice, on this version of religious fictionalism, is fundamentally 
different in nature from a believer’s practice.
Nonetheless, as we’ve seen, the naturalist is able to access some experi-
ences that are similar to those of the believer, and one reason for this does 
have to do with how intelligible the idea of the transcendent can become. 
The strange situation we are in with respect to the demarcation of religion is 
this. As Crane acknowledges (despite his criticism of the New Atheists’ focus 
on cosmological elements), the religious impulse is a key feature of religion. 
Since naturalism is defined in terms of the belief(s) it rejects, the religious 
impulse lies at the heart of what separates religious believers from naturalists. 
And yet the content of the religious impulse is inherently paradoxical and 
ultimately has to remain mysterious.34
V. concluding ReMaRks
The theme of this collection of articles, ‘Philosophy, Religion, and Hope’, is 
open to a variety of interpretations. The interpretation I’ve focused on is, what 
is the role that religious doctrine plays in religion, and to what extent can natu-
ralists enter into aspects of the religious way of life? My aim was to relate the 
philosophical discussion on these questions to Tim Crane’s The Meaning of Be-
lief, especially his claim that atheists can derive no genuine solace from religion.
I’ve argued that while there are limits to naturalistic religious practice, there 
is an experientially significant remainder accessible to naturalists who feel so 
inclined. Whether or not this remainder involves anything properly describ-
able as ‘genuine’ solace, it can be of enough value to the naturalist to be worth 
engaging in, and it need involve no mental fragmentation or hypocrisy. I’ve 
also suggested that there is a version of fictionalism that can underwrite this 
practice, on which one treats a religion as a story to be imaginatively entered 
into and brought to life. Moreover, the significance of this kind of activity is all 
34 Is there a tension between this talk of mystery in the content of the religious impulse and 
taking a realist approach to the semantics of religious language? I am not sure there is: a stable 
semantic content is not the same as a definite or non-mysterious semantic content.
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the greater if one is prepared to take on board Crane’s claim that religious belief 
is inherently paradoxical, for which I’ve provided some support.
A different way to interpret the theme ‘Philosophy, Religion, and Hope’ 
would be this: when it comes to matters of inter-religious dialogue, includ-
ing dialogue between the religious and the non-religious, is there reason to 
be hopeful? And, can philosophy help? Though not an academic philoso-
phy book, The Meaning of Belief demonstrates how philosophy can help. The 
book’s closing sentences highlight the connection between these two ways of 
interpreting the theme:
The problems the world is facing are practical political problems, problems 
whose solutions need cooperation, coordination, and compromise. Any 
view about how atheists and theists should live together and interact must 
ultimately confront the fact that neither religion nor secularism is going 
to disappear. The least we can hope for is peaceful coexistence, while the 
most we can hope for is a kind of dialogue between those who hold very 
different views of reality. A genuine dialogue of this kind will be very difficult 
to achieve, but the first step must be for each side to gain an adequate 
understanding of the views of the other.35,36
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